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CONSUMER NEWS
Supreme Court Spotlight: Lamps Plus,

Inc., et al. v. Frank Varela
James Orescanin, News Editor∗

The Supreme Court has not finished hearing cases
regarding arbitration clauses and class actions. Following
numerous decisions on these key consumer issues in recent
Supreme Court jurisprudence, 1 the Court recently slated an
additional case on class actions and mandatory arbitration clauses:
Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela. 2 Encompassing both issues in one fell
swoop, the Court in Varela is tasked with determining whether the
Federal Arbitration Act 3 (“FAA”) forecloses a state-law
interpretation of an arbitration agreement which would authorize
class arbitration based solely on “general language commonly used
in arbitration agreements.” 4

BACKGROUND
Before going into the facts of the case, it is necessary to
consider the FAA and its role in the Court’s recent decisions. The
FAA was enacted in 1925 in response to “widespread judicial
∗ J.D. Candidate, May 2019, Loyola University Chicago School of Law
1
See, e.g., Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp, 559 U.S.
662, 687 (2010); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 352 (2011);
CompuCredit Corp v. Greenwood, 565 U.S. 95, 104-05 (2012); Marmet Health
Care Center, Inc. v. Brown, 565 U.S. 530, 543 (2012); Nitro-Lift Technologies,
LLC v. Howard, 568 U.S. 17, 22 (2012); American Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors
Restaurant, 570 U.S. 228, 239 (2013); DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S.Ct.
463, 471 (2015); Kindred Nursing Centers Ltd. Partnership v. Clark, 137 S.Ct.
1421, 1429 (2017); Epic Systems Corp v. Lewis, 138 S.Ct. 1612, 1632 (2018).
2
701 Fed.Appx. 670, 673 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. granted, Lamps Plus, Inc. v.
Varela, 138 S.Ct. 1697 (2018). The case is docketed at Supreme Court Case No.
17-988.
3
9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2018).
4
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, No. 17-988
(Jan. 10, 2018).
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hostility to arbitration agreements.” 5 As interpreted by the Court,
the FAA reflects both “a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration”
and the “fundamental principle that arbitration is a matter of
contract.” 6 Based on this interpretation, the Court has repeatedly
held that the FAA prohibits courts from invalidating mandatory
arbitration agreements in consumer contracts based on state law, 7
a finding that the arbitration provision is unconscionable under a
state’s precedent, 8or a finding that mandatory arbitration would
conflict with other Federal law. 9
The Court’s decisions enforcing mandatory arbitration
clauses under the FAA have also diminished the ability of a
consumer to bring a class action lawsuit. For instance, in StoltNielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp, AnimalFeeds
brought a class action lawsuit against Stolt-Nielsen after learning
that Stolt-Nielsen was engaged in an illegal price-fixing
conspiracy. 10 Because the parties had a commercial agreement
which included a mandatory arbitration clause, the parties agreed
that the dispute must be settled by arbitration. 11 However,
AnimalFeeds demanded that the claims be resolved through class
arbitration, and sought to represent the class of all direct
purchasers of services and goods from Stolt-Nielsen who were
affected by the alleged price-fixing. 12 Contrary to their demand, the
Court held that AnimalFeeds was not authorized to compel class
arbitration because the parties’ contract was silent as to the issue
of class-action arbitration. 13 According to the Court, in deciding
this issue the question was not whether class arbitration was a
“procedural mode” available to present AnimalFeeds’ claims, but
5
6
7

Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 339.
Id.
Id. at 341 (“When state law prohibits outright the arbitration of a

particular type of claim, the analysis is straightforward: The conflicting rule is
displaced by the FAA”).
8
Id. at 352; see also Marmet Health Care Center, Inc., 565 U.S. at 534
(reversing a state’s prohibition against pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate
personal injury or wrongful death claims against nursing homes); Kindred
Nursing Centers Ltd. Partnership, 137 S.Ct. at 1426-27; DIRECTV, Inc., 136
S.Ct. at 471.
9
Epic Systems Corp, 138 S.Ct. at 1627 (noting that the Court has rejected
every effort to displace the FAA by an allegedly conflicting federal statute,
including claims of conflict between the FAA and the Sherman Act, the Credit
Repair Organizations Act, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act).
10
559 U.S. at 667.
11
Id. at 668.
12
Id.
13
Id. at 687.
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“whether the parties agreed to authorize class arbitration.” 14
Similarly, in American Express Co. v. Italian Colors
Restaurant, Italian Colors filed a class action lawsuit against
American Express alleging violations of the Sherman Act. 15 The
parties had a contractual agreement which included a mandatory
arbitration clause, and the agreement specifically provided that
neither party had a right for any claims to be arbitrated on a class
action basis.16 In spite of this provision, Italian Colors filed a class
action lawsuit and argued that the contractual waiver of class
action claims should be unenforceable. 17 It argued that the cost of
proving an individual claim under the Sherman Act would range
from several hundred thousand dollars to over a million dollars,
while the maximum recovery for an individual claimant would be
between just twelve thousand to thirty-eight thousand dollars, and
thus, upholding the agreement would “contravene the policies of
the antitrust laws.” 18 The Court rejected Italian Colors’ argument
and held that the contractual waiver of class action claims was
enforceable. 19 In reaching this conclusion, the Court explained that
“the antitrust laws do not guarantee an affordable procedural path
to the vindication of every claim[,]” and noted that the Sherman
Act did not make any mention of class actions. 20 Accordingly, the
alleged antitrust violations could not be resolved through class
actions, as that would contravene the FAA. 21
Under the Court’s interpretation of the FAA, many
scholars argue that the once prevalent consumer class action has
been all but eliminated, at detriment to consumers. 22 For instance,
some studies have found that the banning of consumer class
actions in arbitration has resulted in consumers simply neglecting
to pursue their claims, given that the claims are for relatively small
14
Id. (“We think that the differences between bilateral and class-action
arbitration are too great for arbitrators to presume, consistent with their limited
powers under the FAA, that the parties’ mere silence on the issue of class-action
arbitration constitutes consent to resolve their disputes in class proceedings.”).
15
570 U.S. at 231.
16
Id.
17
Id. at 231-32.
18
Id. at 232-34.
19
Id. at 239.
20
Id. at 234-35.
21
Id. at 239.
22
See, e.g., James Morsch, Unconscionability Should Not Be the Sole
Arbiter of Whether to Enforce Mandatory Arbitration Provisions, 30 LOY.
CONSUMER L. REV. 24 (2017); Myriam Giles, Opting Out of Liability: The
Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L.
REV. 373 (2005).
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amounts. 23 This is detrimental to consumers “given that the
purpose of class actions is to permit low value claims to be joined
to make litigation of such claims worthwhile in order to hold
corporate entities accountable for small harms that can collectively
provide large corporate profits.” 24 In addition, some argue that
even when consumers bring individual claims to arbitration, the
corporate entities are likely to prevail due to being “repeat players”
before the arbitrators. 25 Finally, commentators argue that barriers
to class action lawsuits are detrimental to several public goals due
to class actions’ unique ability to “fight racial discrimination,
achieve equality in the workplace, and tackle consumer fraud.” 26

LAMPS PLUS, INC. V. VARELA
With the above background in mind, the importance of the
present case can be readily seen. The facts of the case are not in
dispute. The Respondent, Frank Varela (“Varela”), is an employee
of the Petitioner, Lamps Plus, Inc. (“Lamps Plus”). 27 In March of
2016, a Lamps Plus employee inadvertently allowed a criminal to
gain access to copies of W-2 income and tax withholding
statements of approximately 1,300 of its employees, including
Varela. 28 As a result, a fraudulent federal tax return was filed in
Varela’s name. 29 Upon learning this, Varela filed suit in federal
court in California, asserting federal and state law claims on behalf
of a class of current and former employees of Lamps Plus, and
others injured by the exposure of this information. 30 However,
because Varela’s employment agreement contained a mandatory
arbitration provision, Lamps Plus moved to compel arbitration
and dismiss Varela’s claims. 31
The District Court rejected Varela’s arguments against
arbitration, finding that the dispute was within the employment
agreement’s scope, and that there was nothing substantively

23
Margaret Moses, How the Supreme Court’s Misconstruction of the FAA
Has Affected Consumers, 30 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 1, 18 (2017).
24
Id.
25
Terry F. Moritz, Can Consumers’ Rights Effectively Be Vindicated in
the Post-AT&T Mobility World?, 30 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 32, 42-43 (2017).
26
Giles, supra note 22, at 430.

Brief of Respondent at 2, Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, No. 17-988 (Mar.
14, 2018).
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Id. at 3.
31
Id.
27
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unconscionable about the agreement. 32 Thus, Varela was required
to go to arbitration. However, the court found that the agreement
also authorized class arbitration, despite no specific provision
stating such. 33 The court recognized that under Stolt-Nielsen, a
party may not be compelled to participate in class arbitration
unless there was a contractual basis for concluding that it agreed
to do so. 34 However, the court found that the language of the
agreement was ambiguous as to whether it allowed arbitration of
class claims. 35 Construing the agreement against the drafter,
Lamps Plus, applying California state law, the court concluded
that there was a contractual basis for class arbitration and granted
Lamps Plus’s motion to compel arbitration, without limiting the
order to Varela’s individual claim. 36
Lamps Plus appealed to the Ninth Circuit, who affirmed
the district court’s decision authorizing Varela’s claims to be
brought in class arbitration. 37 The court noted that the parties
agreed that the employment agreement included no express
mention of class proceedings, but found that this was not the type
of “silence” contemplated in Stolt-Nielsen. 38 Looking to the
language of the employment agreement which stated that
“arbitration shall be in lieu of any and all lawsuits or other civil
legal proceedings relating to my employment”, the court found that
class proceedings was included within the definition of a lawsuit
or legal proceeding. The court further reasoned, “[t]hat arbitration
will be ‘in lieu of’ a set of actions that includes class actions can be
reasonably read to allow for class arbitration.” 39 Finally, the court
explained that a class action is a “procedural device for resolving
the claims” rather than being a distinct claim. 40 Thus, because
Varela surrendered his right to bring all lawsuits, civil actions, or
proceedings, but was allowed to bring claims to be submitted to an
arbitrator who could “award any remedy allowed by applicable
law”, the court concluded that those remedies included class-wide
relief. 41

32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41

Id. at 3-4.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Varela, 701 Fed.Appx. at 673.
Id. at 672.
Id.
Id. at 673.
Id.
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SUPREME COURT PROCEEDINGS
Lamps Plus filed a writ of certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court, arguing that the Ninth Circuit’s ruling was
contrary to the Court’s longstanding precedent, including StoltNielsen. 42 Lamps Plus argues that the Ninth Circuit “simply
disregarded numerous terms in the parties’ arbitration agreement
that plainly contemplate bilateral arbitration” and that the court
“purported to divine contractual consent to class arbitration from
language found in virtually any standard arbitration clause.” 43
Lamps Plus also argues that the Ninth Circuit’s decision consisted
of state-law “interpretive acrobatics” to support its own policy
preference for class actions, which the Court has long rejected as
being incompatible with the FAA. 44 In short, Lamps Plus’s
argument is that this decision contravenes the Court’s clear
holdings regarding the FAA, and that allowing this ruling would
“empower courts and arbitrators to impose class procedures on
unconsenting parties and create substantial practical problems.” 45
Varela, on the other hand, first argues that the Court has no
jurisdiction to hear Lamps Plus’s appeal.46 He argues that the
district court’s decision had two parts, and neither of those parts
were appealable under federal law. 47 As to the merits of the case,
Varela argues that the application of California contract law
principles to determine the agreement was proper, as “the FAA
does not displace generally applicable state contract-law rules.” 48
He argues that under California contract law, the ambiguous
language of the employment agreement should be construed
against the drafter, and that “whether the lower courts correctly
applied these [state law principles] is a question of state law illsuited to resolution by this Court.” 49
The case was recently argued on October 29, 2018, and the
Court’s ruling is impending. The impact of this ruling may affect
Petition for writ of certiorari at 3, Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, No. 17-988
(Jan. 10, 2018).
43
Id. at 4
44
Id.
45
Id. at 23.
46
Brief of Brief of Respondent at 6, Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, No. 17-988
(Mar. 14, 2018).
47
Id. Interestingly, Varela seeks to use the FAA as a shield, given that the
FAA expressly prohibits appeal of orders directing arbitration. See 9 U.S.C. §
16(b)(2).
48
Brief of Brief of Respondent at 6, Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, No. 17-988
(Mar. 14, 2018).
49
Id. at 7.
42
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consumers for years to come. If the Court were to rule in favor of
Varela, it would allow other courts to use state law to potentially
find ambiguities in arbitration agreements which manifest into
“consent” to class arbitration. This, in turn, could reinvigorate the
consumer class action lawsuit, at least until such time as these
arbitration agreements are modernized to specifically exclude class
arbitration. On the other hand, given the Court’s consistent, broad
interpretation of the FAA, it is likely that the Court will find in
favor of Lamps Plus, and hold that the contract must clearly show
assent to class arbitration before such arbitration can be imposed
on a party.

